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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that the policies implicit in economic fundamentalism are not inevitable because of the logic of capitalism, but are 
policies that have been actively promoted by the corporate sector in its own interests. The ideology of economic fundamentalism 
presents a rigid conditioning framework which affects economic and other public policies which have been important for women's 
equality and consequently, has undermined feminist successes in Canada. 
RESUME 
Cet expose soutient que les politiques implicites dans le fondamentalisme cconomique ne sont pas inevitables a cause de la logique 
du capital isme, mais qu'elles sont des politiques qui ont ete promues de facon active par les grandes compagnies, pour leurs propres 
inter£ts. L'ideologie d'un fondamentalisme economique presente un cadre de conditionnement rigide, qui affecte les politiques 
Sconomiques et d'autres politiques publiques qui ont 6t6 importantes pour l'egaliti des femmes et par consequent,ont amoindri les 
succes ftministes au Canada. 
T H E P O W E R O F E C O N O M I C 
F U N D A M E N T A L I S M 
Economic fundamentalism, unlike 
religious fundamentalism, has gained such 
widespread credibility in Canada and other 
wealthy nations that it is now the driving force 
behind public policy changes associated with 
globalization and restructuring. While religious 
fundamentalism is still treated with some 
skepticism because it appears dogmatic and r igid, 
economic fundamentalism has become accepted as 
a sensible framework for understanding the 
changes which are occurring in the world. The 
ideas o f economic fundamentalism are remarkably 
simple: they are based on a philosophy o f 
individualism and the pursuit o f self interest in 
which buying and selling on "the market," 
regulates the ways in which human needs are met. 
The quaint term, "the market," belies the far-
reaching implications o f how this mechanism, as a 
regulator o f human behaviour, has supplanted in 
our collective subconscious, other, gentler notions 
o f morality, citizenship, and relations between 
people. 
Economic fundamentalism is as 
dangerous for women as any other form o f 
fundamentalism because it establishes a r ig id 
framework for the thinking o f society. Dur ing the 
past one-hundred and fifty years, feminists in 
western industrialized nations have challenged the 
idea of an unregulated market as the best and most 
efficient way to meet human needs. The market is 
good at allocating resources under certain 
circumstances, but these are limited: it is very 
selective about what it values and the less the 
value is related to hard cash, the more suspicious 
the market becomes o f its veracity. W o m e n did not 
need lengthy analyses o f economic theory to 
realize that the acts o f buying and selling on the 
market were not sufficient to meet their needs: the 
market could not recognize the value o f then-
work, eliminate discrimination and oppression, or 
overcome chronic unemployment and poverty. 
W o m e n had experienced first-hand the power o f 
the market to keep them in their place and knew 
that only attempts to control the market could 
begin to rectify their circumstances o f oppression. 
The efforts to humanize capitalism have been the 
great projects o f the twentieth century and while 
feminists have been dissatisfied with many o f the 
results, those gains we have made are in much 
jeopardy wi th the recent successes o f economic 
fundamentalism. 
Our wor ld is getting meaner and as we 
reach the mil lennium, ideas about collective ways 
o f solving social problems have lost ground to 
arguments that the rules o f competition are 
inevitable in the face o f globalization. The 
apparent inevitability o f a meaner wor ld is 
reinforced by the remarkable ideological 
convergence o f poli t ical and economic institutions 
around the wor ld . Where diversity in economic 
and poli t ical institutions was once tolerated, 
uniformity is now demanded by international 
institutions. This uniformity has such strength that 
politicians no longer feel the need to convince 
people that the future could be better or 
specifically, that their poli t ical parties' policies 
could bring about greater equality and economic 
security. The critical difference between 
economic dislocation now and economic hard-
times in other eras is this gr im message for the 
future. For the past fifty years, widespread 
economic hardship usually has been viewed as a 
temporary aberration in a system which, in the 
long run, would work. In contrast, the 
restructuring associated wi th globalization 
promises little to those traditionally disadvantaged 
in our society: the unemployed cannot expect jobs, 
the poor cannot expect prosperity, and the 
disadvantaged cannot expect equality. The 
justification for economic change focuses almost 
solely on the competitive benefits for business 
internationally. Social and economic well-being is 
subordinate to the well-being of the corporate 
sector and harmonization downward (for people) 
is perceived to be necessary so that the corporate 
sector w i l l be in a position to compete 
internationally. 
H o w d id we get to a point where as a 
society, we have more or less given up on the 
notion o f controlling greed? H o w did freedom 
become so narrowly constrained to mean only 
economic freedom? H o w did human society 
become so decidedly an accessory to the economic 
system? A n d , how did the logic o f the welfare 
state get broken? 
The new economic orthodoxy is, in some 
ways, very familiar but its "inevitability," and the 
fundamentalist zeal with which it is pursued gives 
it a disturbing new dimension. The wor ld is 
certainly changing, but that is something which in 
itself is not new: economic restructuring has been 
the very defining feature o f capitalism. Even the 
acceleration o f change is so familiar that change is 
expected and anticipated. The ideas associated 
with the new economic orthodoxy too are familiar. 
These ideas have dominated the wor ld o f 
economists and public policy makers for a few 
hundred years. What then, is different? 
I w i l l argue in this paper that the shift to 
the right at the end o f the twentieth century was 
not inevitable because o f the logic o f economic 
forces, but was a carefully planned occurrence. 
Ideas about the moral superiority o f personal 
responsibility and the freedom o f individual choice 
have gained ascendancy through deliberate 
strategies o f control and dissemination o f ideas on 
behalf o f the corporate elite. These ideas have, 
then, become the foundation for shaping 
international political institutions which have 
provided a rule book, or conditioning framework, 
affecting future decision-making. Throughout this 
process the nation state has shifted its role from 
one which at least tempered the ability o f the r ich 
and powerful to dominate, to one which followed 
the path of least difficulty, by championing mainly 
the interests o f the powerful. The changing nature 
o f the state was itself made possible by the 
conditioning framework put in place by 
international political institutions. M y focus on the 
state w i l l be important because it relates to my 
final point, which is that the neo-conservative 
direction is not an inevitable one and collective 
poli t ical action could force governments to 
respond to ideas substantially different from those 
o f the neo-conservative elites. This is o f crucial 
importance to women and other disadvantaged 
groups because it has been through the logic o f the 
welfare state that major advances in redistribution 
have been advanced in our society. These ideas 
and economic institutions have been critical in 
shaping the egalitarian successes o f feminism in 
Canada and as the rise o f fundamentalist ideas 
force the dissolution o f the institutions o f 
redistribution, the work of feminists becomes more 
precarious. 1 
T H E B R E A K IN T H E L O G I C O F S O C I A L 
W E L F A R E 
In its first issue for 1997 the Globe and 
Mails publication Report on Business featured an 
article on the United States, " B i g Brother Bows 
Out." The article's lead seemed to breathe a sigh 
o f relief: "at long last, jolt ing reforms are in store 
for formerly untouchable institutions, including 
social security, public education and welfare." 2 
Just a few years ago to express this k ind 
o f sentiment would have been unthinkable. 
Newspaper editors, as wel l as politicians, knew 
that people appreciated and loved their social 
programs. Welfare may always have been suspect, 
because it was the down and out who needed it, 
but public education, public health care, and public 
old age pensions were needed by everyone. 
They're still revered, at least in Canada, according 
to the most extensive and recent surveys on the 
issue. 3 Despite the popularity o f social programs, 
the media relentlessly pushes the need for change 
and politicians, even those in N D P governments, 
are echoing the sentiment, although usually these 
politicians are more circumspect and do not 
directly advocate privatization, but rather refer to 
the need for "public/private partnerships" and 
"deregulation." With prisons and even publicly 
funded welfare schemes being run by private 
enterprise in the U .S . , the ideas about reducing, 
redesigning, privatizing and eliminating social 
programs, which were once shocking and 
untouchable in Canada, now seem not just 
reasonable, but necessary. It isn't even 
unthinkable, as the market invades all spheres, for 
sense to be made of the idea that companies should 
make profits out o f poverty. 4 When confronted 
with the continued insistence that we can no longer 
afford expensive social programs, people in 
Canada quite sensibly, then, feel it is time to 
explore other alternatives. 
The shift in the logic o f capitalism which 
leads people to begin to abandon their support o f 
the public sector required both the idea that the 
public sector could no longer be adequately 
supported collectively through taxes, and the 
erection o f an apparatus internationally which 
assured that this thinking would appear logical. 
These two developments are inseparable, but I w i l l 
proceed to develop the argument by first 
discussing the ways in which the increased 
economic integration o f nations, through trade 
liberalization, broke the logic o f the cooperation o f 
business, government, and people in the welfare 
state. 
The development o f the social welfare 
state, particularly in the shape it took after Wor ld 
War II, required the cooperation of the corporate 
sector. For a long while ~ from the end of the 
depression o f the 1930s until the mid-1980s, ~ 
economic policies which focused on full 
employment, high wages, and social support 
systems made sense to the corporate community as 
a g roup . 5 Individually each business knew that it 
could make higher profits than its competitors i f it 
could reduce costs by paying low wages to its 
workers and avoiding taxes. But collectively the 
corporate world understood that i f selling products 
or services meant a reliance on people within the 
nation to buy them, it would be important for these 
people to have the money to do so. The welfare of 
the people within a nation was intrinsically l inked 
to the ability o f mass production to find a mass of 
customers to purchase the things produced. 
Individually corporations could do wel l i f 
unemployment rates were high because then 
workers would be competing for jobs and wages 
would fall, but this low-wage strategy could not 
work for al l producers simultaneously i f they 
wanted to sell al l they produced. A similar logic 
prevailed for the provision o f public works and 
social programs: individually firms would have 
higher profits i f they did not pay taxes, but 
collectively they would suffer i f the state could not 
afford an infrastructure to support business 
activities. 
With the uncoupling of the production o f 
a nation from its markets, which is the objective o f 
trade liberalization, the logic o f maintaining a high 
standard of l iv ing within a nation begins to lose its 
saliency. The growth in the significance of export 
markets means that higher rates o f unemployment 
and lower wages can be tolerated, since the people 
with in the country w i l l not be required to buy all 
that is produced within that country in order for 
the corporate sector to maintain itself. This 
dynamic has been spectacularly obvious in Canada 
since the introduction o f free trade. Historically, 
Canada has been a more export oriented country 
than most, with between twenty-five and thirty 
percent o f its national income coming from selling 
things to other countries. This is in contrast to 
other countries like Japan, which derives only 
about fifteen percent o f its national income from 
trade. The trade related proportion o f the U . S . 
income is even less—about twelve percent a year. 6 
Since the introduction o f N A F T A the significance 
o f trade has increased substantially for Canada so 
that by 1995 thirty-eight percent o f the national 
income came from trade. Under these 
circumstances the logic o f a Keynesian welfare 
state became easier to undermine. The result is an 
export-led economy with unemployment and 
inequality its permanent defining features. From 
the perspective o f corporations, not having to rely 
on selling what they produce within the nation is 
ideal because costs can be lowered significantly 
without danger o f creating economic conditions 
which would negatively affect the ability to sell, as 
w o u l d be the case in a more closed economic 
system. Internationally the corporations can 
become "more competitive," as we've seen occur 
within Canada. 
T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L CONDITIONING 
F R A M E W O R K , O R , H O W 
G L O B A L I Z A T I O N M A K E S W O M E N 
P O O R E R 
For some time women have been 
conscious o f the distinct implications o f 
globalization and restructuring for different groups 
o f women throughout the wor ld . Initially the 
reactions focused on the effects on women's work 
as international systems o f production and 
distribution became more dominant. A s Swasi 
Mitter's classic book Common Fare/Common 
Bond: Women in the Global Economy indicated, 
women's work in both poor and wealthy countries 
was being adversely affected by the increased 
power o f international corporations to shape the 
wor ld according to their own needs. 7 Women in 
poorer countries were among the first women to 
understand the immense power o f international 
organizations like the W o r l d Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund to insist, through 
programs o f "Structural Adjustment," on 
establishing the market and export-oriented growth 
as the organizing principles for development. 
Whi le in theory, the focus on export markets was 
supposed to make nations richer, women knew 
they were becoming much poorer. 8 In Canada the 
dangers o f globalization were first polit ically 
recognized by feminist organizations when 
discussions o f free trade emerged in the early 
1980s. 9 Our initial concern, as was the case with 
women in poor countries, was first triggered by the 
implications for women's jobs, particularly the 
threat to those women whose employment 
positions have usually been more precarious. 1 0 But 
as we learned more about free trade, we began to 
understand that its effects were more a l l -
encompassing. Globalization has become a 
metaphor for the conditioning framework which 
shapes all o f our choices, not just those for our 
work. Mos t significantly, it entrenches values 
which provide a view o f the world in which the 
interests o f the powerful are defined as necessity, 
while the demands o f the poor appear as greed 
which undermines economic success. 
The ideology underpinning globalization 
focuses on the efficacy of trade for improving the 
conditions o f people everywhere. It is an old idea 
which sees the increasing integration o f 
international economies as a positive step and one 
which would inevitably occur, i f markets are not 
unduly hampered by governments. It is based on 
the nineteenth century notion o f comparative 
advantage. The argument is that trade between 
nations w i l l always benefit a l l parties involved. 
Earlier trade theory understood that trade would 
occur when one country produced something that 
either another country could not, or could produce 
only at great cost, (the least-cost theory) and that 
the objective for every country was to encourage 
exports and restrain imports in order to bring more 
gold or silver into the country: any benefit to one 
nation was matched by costs to other nations, so 
that there were no net gains from trade. In contrast, 
the theory o f comparative advantage understood 
trade to be to the advantage o f both trading 
partners, even when one country produced 
everything more cheaply than the other. The 
explanation for this is that each country, by using 
its resources to produce and trade things in which 
it had a "relative" advantage, all countries would 
be better off and total production in the world 
would increase. 
This idea o f comparative advantage was a 
revolutionary notion and, since it was basically 
counter-intuitive, was not automatically taken up 
throughout the wor ld . But during the nineteenth 
century when British imperialism was at its height, 
Britain's ideological dominance in trade and ideas 
about trade began to prevail. It was not until very 
recently in the twentieth century, however, that the 
apparatus to entrench the ideology o f free trade 
internationally was put into place. The objective of 
free trade has been the governing principle of 
international economic organizations since the 
Bretton Woods conference in 1944. The threat o f 
the return o f conditions of the 1930s, which were 
believed to have been caused by excessive trade 
protectionist measures of nations, was the 
justification for the pursuit o f the ideal. The plan 
was for the move toward free trade to proceed 
incrementally and with each "round" of the 
General Agreement o f Tariffs and Trade ( G A T T ) , 
which occurred at ten year intervals, further 
measures l iberalizing trade were introduced. The 
whole free trade initiative was accelerated with the 
Canada/U.S. Free Trade Agreement ( F T A , 1989); 
the North American Free Trade Agreement 
( N A F T A , 1991); and the last General Agreement 
on Tar i f f and Trade which replaced itself with the 
W o r l d Trade Organization in 1995. 
Free trade is pursued because 
international corporations want to create 
conditions for the free movement o f capital and 
freedom from the ability o f nation states to inhibit 
business transactions. According to the U . N . 
Centre on Transnational Corporations, between 80 
and 90% o f the exports o f industrialized countries 
are in the hands o f giant international corporations 
wi th sales o f over $1 bi l l ion annually. There are 
6000 o f these throughout the world and they are 
responsible for twenty-five percent o f everything 
produced in the world , yet they employ only three 
percent o f the world's labour force. The main 
point to understand from this is that the 
international economy has been designed with 
these giant players in mind and the rules for action 
accommodate their best interests. The narrow 
interests this free trade regime favours is startling 
when one considers Canada's export situation. A 
recent Wor ld Trade Organization report pointed 
out that only fifty companies in Canada account 
for about half o f the country's total exports. M a n y 
of these are the U.S.-owned automotive companies 
which dominate exports in Canada." 
The ideology o f free trade is a very 
powerful tool for international capital to shape the 
wor ld according to its advantage. The belief that 
the pure workings of the market at the 
international level w i l l ultimately sort out all 
human needs has almost evangelical proportions 
and is quite at odds with the more pessimistic 
message at the national level about the effect o f 
increased competition. A s one recent 
commentator, W i l l Hutton, put it, "...aggressive 
free trade is good. Busy sea-lanes and teeming 
ports are the handmaidens o f prosperity for a l l . . . ' " 2 
However, even for some supporters o f free trade, it 
is now becoming clear that the real wor ld is not as 
neat as traditional trade theory would l ike us to 
believe. Even Hutton recognizes the profound 
dislocations caused by international competition 
and calls for some kind o f international regulation 
o f financial markets. Trade can bring huge 
benefits, but also can have tragic consequences for 
the shape o f a nation's future. This has been most 
obvious in nations in Af r ica and Lat in Amer ica 
wh ich have been encouraged (or forced) to 
specialize in export production to the detriment o f 
feeding their own people. In many o f these areas 
small-scale household production carried on by 
women becomes displaced by large-scale export 
production owned by men. 
The shift to crops or manufactured items 
which command lucrative prices on international 
markets fits squarely into the notion o f 
comparative advantage. According to trade theory, 
it is rational to shift resources from small-scale, 
largely self-sufficient individual household 
production to large-scale production o f products 
for the export market. The higher incomes from 
trade can then be used to import cheaper food 
from western countries. It is a l l rational until 
foreign markets turn sour for the specific export 
(something which occurs with depressing 
regularity) and the price o f importing food to feed 
the people who no longer have an income becomes 
ruinous. This effect o f export-led growth is the 
common trajectory o f poor nations who are 
hopelessly in debt to banks in wealthy countries, 
as they borrow during global economic downturns 
just to feed their populations. The need to borrow 
from wealthy countries has been good business for 
banks in countries like Canada and the U . S . 
A c c o r d i n g to a recent Oxfam report, Afr ica has 
repaid what it borrowed one and a half times over. 
Last year alone poor nations paid the International 
Monetary Fund ( I M F ) $1 b i l l ion more than was 
lent them in new loans. 1 3 The logic o f an integrated 
international production and distribution system 
benefits western corporate interests but results in 
desperate poverty for many parts o f the world. 
O N E M A R K E T , M A N Y S T A T E S 
With in industrialized nations the ability 
o f the state to control the actions o f corporations 
appears to have been seriously restricted by the 
new international context o f globalization. The 
great advantage o f the new international rules o f 
trade to multinational corporations is their ability 
to escape regulation o f nation states. The trade 
agreements work toward establishing one giant 
global market, while, at the same time, l imiting the 
nature o f the supranational institutions to market-
creating activities. These are mainly actions 
designed to create greater capital mobili ty and to 
expand international markets in general. Unl ike 
the work o f nation states, which over time have 
developed institutions either to correct the 
economy when the market d id not function in an 
optimal way, such as during times o f depression, 
or to control business, such as through labour or 
environmental legislation, the international 
replacements that are being created neither exert 
discipline on the market nor function as 
instruments o f market-correction. These functions 
are still the responsibility o f nations, but as 
multinational corporations become more mobile, 
the ability o f corporations to escape the regulation 
o f states increases. A s nations compete with each 
other to have businesses locate in their own 
countries, the ability to control corporate activity 
comes into direct conflict with the increased 
mobi l i ty o f these corporations. Unless a l l nations 
agree to behave in the same way with regard to 
corporate behaviour, the corporations w i l l not be 
disciplined at all . A n y one nation, by insisting on 
greater standards o f corporate behaviour, w i l l be 
disadvantaged and its corporations w i l l c la im that 
they are being made uncompetitive relative to 
other corporations in the international market. 
Since there is no mechanism for the nations to act 
collectively, individual state action is crit ically 
weakened. The new international trade agreements 
have facilitated the creation o f a single market 
without a single state to regulate it. In this sense 
the growth in power o f the corporate sector places 
nations in about the same stage o f control over 
capital as they had at the dawn o f the industrial 
revolution because national institutions are not 
equipped to cope with the nature o f the changes 
which have taken place. The important point is, 
however, not that these changes in the control over 
capital were inevitable, but that the corporate 
sector worked hard, over the years, to see that they 
would occur. 
D E B T / D E F I C I T 
The broad sweep o f economic 
fundamentalism in the international context is 
often more abstract for women than is its effects in 
national contexts. In economic restructuring within 
countries women are conscious that the acts o f 
reduced social spending, reducing taxes for the 
wealthy, and increasing corporate competitiveness 
directly and adversely affect their well-being. 
Economic fundamentalism has created a public 
paranoia about the debt and deficit: the impression 
is that our economy is in trouble because 
government wi ld ly overspent on social programs 
we could not afford. The usual argument from the 
business elites and their political supporters is that 
expensive social programs should be "downsized," 
privatized, or eliminated altogether. The argument 
is that taxes to finance programs are too high and 
these high taxes are bad because they increase 
costs for the corporations. High corporate taxes 
make Canadian products more expensive on 
international markets and also mean less money is 
in the hands o f consumers for buying things on the 
private market. Shifting services now provided by 
the public sector to the private sector has obvious 
appeal to the corporate sector, which now claims it 
has to compete with public provision of some 
services. In this way, increasing privatization is 
directly l inked to the debt and deficit hysteria in 
Canada. 
Socia l programs which have long been 
secure in Canada very rapidly are being 
dismantled. The most recent example o f how 
quickly and devastatingly the redesigns in 
programs can occur in Canada is reflected in the 
changes in unemployment insurance. Women have 
known for a long time that any redesign o f the 
unemployment insurance program would target 
their work, mainly because the characteristics o f a 
substantial portion o f women's work could fairly 
easily be targeted as non-standard employment. 1 4 
Because women are more likely to have different 
types o f work patterns than men who work ful l -
time, full-year, the attempts to restrict U. I . benefits 
to those with "standard" jobs, would eliminate 
many women. 1 S The argument of the right, that 
unemployment insurance was too expensive and 
contributed to unemployment, won out over those 
o f feminist and trade union groups, who argued for 
the necessity for the continuation o f this income 
protection. The results are dramatic: while 88% o f 
the unemployed were covered by unemployment 
insurance in 1989, only 3 1 % are in 1997. 1 6 
Workers most affected, as predicted, are those 
(like many women) who have "non-standard" 
work. In the process o f eliminating huge numbers 
o f people from receiving benefits, the government 
has saved a great deal o f money and thereby 
increased the surplus in the Employment Insurance 
account to $12 b i l l i on . 
The federal government deficit (the 
difference between government revenues and what 
it spends) is large, but the impression that the 
deficit problem arose because of uncontrolled 
government expenditures on social programs is a 
w i l d exaggeration or even deliberate 
misinformation designed to serve the interests o f 
those who want the programs el iminated. 1 7 The 
government has a deficit only because it pays a 
huge amount o f money in interest payments on the 
debt (the sum o f past deficits). In 1996 this is the 
largest single item on the government's books, 
accounting for about $47 b i l l ion , or about 35% o f 
all the revenues it receives. Without these interest 
payments there is a substantial surplus in 
government accounts. In fact in all but two years 
since 1988 the government has taken in more 
money in taxes and other revenues than it has 
spent on all government programs and 
administration. In some years the operating surplus 
has been over $10 b i l l ion , but over the period 
between 1988 and 1995 the government has 
received a total o f over $31 bi l l ion in revenues 
above what was necessary for expenses on social 
programs, other programs (like defense) and 
government administration. 1 8 
Canada's debt began to become a problem 
in the mid-1980s for specific reasons related to the 
government's very conservative ideas about how 
the economy should be managed. The rise in 
government deficits in the 1980s was a response to 
a severe recession, one which affected Canada 
more than any other developed country. During 
this period unemployment rates soared to 12% and 
remained high, averaging over 10% for most o f 
the time since then. Certain government programs 
which are designed to k ick- in when the economy 
is not functioning wel l , that is those cycl ica l ly-
sensitive components o f program spending like 
unemployment insurance and social assistance 
payments, caused government expenditures to rise 
more dramatically than revenues during this 
period. This is quite a normal occurrence during a 
depression period and this excess government 
spending would not have caused a problem, in fact 
it undoubtedly prevented the recession from being 
considerably worse than it was. A debt was being 
created, but it would not have escalated and 
become the problem it has become were it not for 
the excessively tight monetary pol icy pursued at 
this time, together with the reduction in taxes for 
corporations. 1 9 The government's obsession with 
fighting inflation through high interest rates meant 
that each year the government paid more in 
interest payments for the money it had borrowed 
in the past. These high interest rates created 
problems with chronic unemployment and 
considerably more control o f government policy 
from outside the country. The increased 
attractiveness o f Canadian bonds to foreign 
investors because o f their extraordinarily high 
y ie ld meant that more and more money was owed 
to people outside the country. Less than 3% o f 
Canada's government debt was foreign-held in 
1970. A n d although this had increased to about 
10% by 1980 as a result o f the inflation-fighting 
policies o f the late 1970s, this was still moderate 
compared to the proportion o f the debt held 
outside the country now, which stands at about 
2 5 % . 2 0 The increased foreign debt holdings further 
accentuates the need to keep interest rates high as 
foreign bond holders' opinions o f appropriate 
Canadian economic pol icy has increasing 
significance with policy makers. 
The restrictive monetary policy, that is 
the focus on inflation as the most serious economic 
po l icy , was a severe over-reaction to a problem 
which d id not really exist. The inflation rate in the 
early 1980s was high, but it fell from 11% in the 
early 1980s to about 4.5% when the Conservative 
government took power in 1984. That is, by this 
time inflation wasn't a problem but inflation 
fighting through high interest rates remained a 
crucial part o f economic pol icy. Even today the 
threat o f inflation guides the Bank o f Canada's 
interest rate policy. Real inflation does not and has 
not existed for over ten years. 
The deficit did not arise from reckless 
government spending. The deficit exists because 
o f an ideologically driven, recklessly restrictive 
monetary pol icy which has created conditions 
resulting in both higher costs for government and 
reduced revenues. The cure, o f reducing spending 
on counter-cyclical programs, like unemployment 
insurance, cannot solve either the deficit problem 
or the economic morass experienced by most o f 
the country. Controlling the deficit without solving 
the underlying weaknesses in the economy w i l l 
only mean years and years o f economic hardship 
for some, and high rates o f unemployment, and a 
decline in the standard o f l iv ing o f most 
Canadians. 
This is where the policy procedures bog 
down. Economic orthodoxy suggests that just 
letting the market take its course w i l l ultimately 
right a dismal situation. Perhaps some external 
event could occur to stimulate economic activity, 
but waiting for this to happen is not a wise 
strategy. A n active economic strategy to ensure 
full employment and to meet other social and 
economic goals, as so often has been said, is 
needed. 
The differences for governments now is 
that the ability to act takes a great deal more 
poli t ical courage than it ever did. This is because 
the economic tools to discipline the market are not 
as readily available as they were in the past and 
the decision to reassert the right to use these tools 
requires a bold political step. But because the tax 
burden has shifted more onto people than onto 
corporations at the same time that people are 
experiencing a reduction in the kinds o f services 
they are used to receiving from government, there 
is a general lack o f support, or even distrust o f 
government in general. Under these circumstances, 
the policies which are so against the interests o f 
the general public and in the interests o f the 
corporate sector, seem to gain more and more 
support. 
W H Y D O P E O P L E S E E M SO R E S I G N E D ? 
The most obvious answer is because they 
are afraid. What is happening to our society is 
unfamiliar and the reasons for change are complex 
and difficult to explain. People are conscious o f 
l iv ing on the edge o f the unknown, a state which 
not only produces anxiety, but also social 
paranoia. Because the reasons for the rapid and 
unsettling change are so complex, representing 
innumerable social factors interacting in a way 
which appear, for the most part, inexplicable, 
people look for clear answers. This is the attraction 
of fundamentalism: the relationship between cause 
and effect is understood as something simple and 
clear. 
The message of the inevitability o f neo-
conservative change is the strongest polit ical 
argument o f economic fundamentalism. This idea, 
that there is some kind o f organic-type growth 
which is inevitable is not just an idea which is 
confined to the political maneuverings o f the right-
-or even to its ideology, rather, it is something 
which is recognizable in the ideologies of both the 
left and the right. The classical liberal economic 
model was founded on the notion that there was a 
natural order to social organization, something 
akin to the natural order o f the physical world. 
Science could uncover the rules which bound 
people together. The logic of this led to a sense 
that social relationships could be self-regulating 
through the market. Not too dis-similarly, the anti-
utopian socialism o f Marxists led to the belief that 
one could discover the logic o f history and while 
people could make a difference, ultimately, it was 
only at the right moment — at the moment when it 
would, in a sense, be inevitable. 
The pervasiveness o f our notion of the 
inevitable march o f history is one o f the reasons 
why the idea embodied in the phase Margaret 
Thatcher used so skillfully, "there is no 
alternative," is so seldom challenged. The other 
reasons have a lot to do with the sheer power of 
those in control and the real difficulties o f 
confronting that power. But power alone, without 
the supporting apparatus of the idea o f what is 
inevitable, has been, historically, more easily 
challenged. Changing the thinking of people so 
that they believe in the inevitability o f what the 
elites want is the real triumph. 
This change in the underlying ideology, 
or subconscious o f a nation, requires planning, 
careful strategies, and the exercise o f power: it 
does not happen spontaneously. This has been 
carefully orchestrated in Canada to such an extent 
that ideas that not only were unpopular but also 
were bad for the country, like free trade and 
restrictive monetary policies, are now realities 
which seemed inevitable. These ideas are 
dangerous. John Maynard Keynes' oft-quoted 
message at the end o f The General Theory point to 
the problem: "...the ideas of economists and 
poli t ical philosophers, both when they are right 
and when they are wrong, are more powerful than 
is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled 
by little else." I f this is true, the main focus for 
change to reflect egalitarian principles w i l l not be 
technological or economic imperatives, but 
different ideas. While I seldom quote the right-
wing institute, The Fraser Institute, to bolster my 
arguments, I do think it is right when it says, " i f 
you are going to change the ideas o f a society then 
you have got to be in the ideas business." 2 1 
C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S 
Feminists are in the ideas business. It was 
not because o f an internal logic in our social or 
economic systems, but by pursuing the ideas o f 
women's equality, that feminists have been able to 
reach some o f their goals. These ideas about 
eliminating women's subordination have been 
advanced, over long periods o f time, in the face o f 
extraordinary odds and against the self-interests o f 
the most powerful in society. For this reason, that 
is the ability o f feminists to succeed despite 
overwhelming odds, I feel feminists are we l l -
placed to advance the ideas for egalitarian projects 
in the twentieth century. 
The major issue to be understood and 
reversed, is the ability o f international institutions 
to insist on uniform economic policies regardless 
o f the historical, cultural, or geographical 
problems of any country. While differences in 
economic and polit ical institutions were tolerated 
internationally in the past, now uniformity through 
the discipline o f the market, is required as a 
condition of international trade regulations. 
Uniform economic policies greatly aid the 
mobil i ty o f capital, but they also greatly 
undermine the power o f people to shape societies 
in their own interests. Women have struggled with 
the necessity of recognizing distinct conditions 
among different groups women: we know that 
women's experiences are not uniform and a single 
analysis reflecting women's conditions is 
inadequate. We know too that the notion that "one 
policy fits a l l " does not work, simply because 
different cultural and polit ical realities are at the 
heart o f our experiences in the world. This is the 
idea that we, as feminists, need to advance at the 
international level. Women 's interests cannot be 
met as long as we cannot be part o f the governing 
structures of our individual societies and we have 
everything to lose when power shifts away from 
people who are responsible to us. The shift in 
power in favour o f corporations and capital 
mobi l i ty distorts ideas-our ideas- l ike freedom 
and equality, which tend to get defined in limited 
ways to reflect narrow notions o f self-interest, 
efficiency, and productivity. The economic 
fundamentalist revolution is not just about 
economics: it sets up economic structures as the 
most significant structures to shape all aspects o f 
our lives. 
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